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.•ocial and organization revolution which I it at orary
society, has its counterpart in the United States Navy. It is the pur
of this paper to examine in some detail the changing basis of authority
discipline in the Navy which has been created by the change in the social
philosophy of the larger society.
In seehing to investigate the changing basis of discipline and au-
thority in the Navy, the author found it convenient to address himself to
five general areas of interest.
First, it was apropos to spotlight the highpoints in the historical
development of the gradual shift away from discipline and authority four
on authoritarianism in order to provide the reader with a basic grasp of
the evolutionary nature of the problem.
Second, it was interesting and vital to the proper understanding of
this trend to attempt to isolate and probe into the reasons underlyin
the new change of philosophy.
Third, it seemed significant to trace the development of the new
code of military justice which formally reflected the acceptance of the
new democratic concept of discipline and authority.
-t, in order to properly gauge the assimilation of this shift away
from discipline based upon domination, it was necessary to investigate less
formal means of implementation.
Finally, the dilemmas, problems and outlook for the future creat
by this changing philosophy are briefly examined.
iii

The need for the proper understanding and appreciation of the shift-
ing emphasis in authority is vital in order for each officer and petty
officer to function effectively in today's Navy. Hopefully, this study
will be of value in clarifying what has happened, why it has happened,
and what is being done to integrate this new democratic philosophy of
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THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHANGE IN THE BASIS OF AUTHORITY
AND DISCIPLINE IN THE UNITED STATES NAVY
The Code of Oleron
,
derived from the sea lavs of the Republic of
Rhodes, was adopted by Richard Coeur de Lion in Marseilles in the twelfth
century while transporting his army by sea from southern France to the
Holy Land. An examination of excerpts from this code is enlightening:
Anyone that should kill another on board ship should be tied to the dead
body and thrown into the sea.
Anyone that should kill another on land should be tied to the dead
body and buried with it in the earth.
Anyone lawfully convicted of drawing a knife or other weapon with
intent to strike another, or of striking another so as to draw blood,
should lose his hand.
Anyone lawfully convicted of theft should have his head shaved and
boiling pitch poured upon it and feathers or down should be strewn
upon it for the distinguishing of the offender; and upon the first
occasion he should be put ashore
.
The Uniform Code of Military Justice , adopted for use bj all of the
armed services of the United States in 1951 offers an interesting contrast
to the Code of Oleron. The following is quoted from Article 55 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice ;
Punishment by flogging, branding, mar lng, tatooing on the bod:,
,
or any cruel or unusual punishment shall not be adjudged by any
court martial or inflicted upon any person subjected to this code.
-Leland P. Lovette, Naval Customs Traditions and Usage (Menasha,
Wisconsin: George ;3anta Co., Inc., 1959)* P« 69.

The use of irons, s >uble, except for the purpose of
custody, is strictly prohibited.
sontrast offered, by these two codes of naval lav which s
300 years of history focuses attention on the change in the concept of
authority and discipline which has evolved over the centuries. It is
the intent of this chapter to examine some of the highpoints in the his-
torical evolution of naval discipline and authority which has led to the
present day Uniform Code of Military Justice .
Richard Coeur de Lion brought the Code of Oleron back to England
upon his return from the Crusades at the beginning of the thirteenth
century. The general tenets of this ancient set of maritime- laws governed
the sea power of England for many years. ~> The Blac)' Book of the British
Admiralty which in large part adopted the principal precepts of the Code
L
of Oleron appeared in the fifteenth century. ' The duties of an admiral
in the fifteenth century were all encompassing and were exercised in
absolute authority. He was to administer .justice "according to the law
and the ancient customs of the sea".^
During the reign of Henry VIII (I509-I5V7) of England, the Orders
for War , to be used both for land and sea, came into existence. These
orders saw the beginning of a paradoxical period during which discipline
remained severe, authority absolute, and great emphasis was given to the in-
stigation of religious rites aboard ships of the British fleet. For example
%lanual for Courts -Martial United States lp51 . p. **31.
Love-tte, p. 69.
Ibid. j p. 70.
5Tbid.

On the fourth offense of a man sleeping on watch the following punish-
ment was ordered:
Being tal;en asleep he shall be hanged to the bowsprit end of the ship
in a basket with a can of beer, a loaf of bread, and a sharp knife,
and choose to hang there until he starve or cut himself loose into
the sea.
These orders also specified that the watch was to be set every night
by eight of the clod: either by trumpets or drum or singing.the Lord's
Prayer, some of the Psalms of David, cr clearing the glass.
The strong religious influence prevalent during the reign of Henry
VTII continued to be felt throughout the Elizabethan and post Elizabethan
periods but abated in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
.
The first statutes containing the courts martial are found in the
British Mutiny xlct of 1o8Q . By this act the ruler of England could authorize
any officer not under the ranh of a. field officer authorization for holding
a general court-martial. ' Although a.lmost three hundred years have trans-
pired since this legislation was enected, it is still the source of the
military law of the English speaking people.
Naval law in England originally was loosely administered. 'The Lord
High Admiral issued policy statements and general instructions, and the
naval commanders administered the law at their discretion. The authority
of the commanders was absolute and sentences were often excessive. Death
sentences were given at the discretion of the commanders 5 even in peace-
time.
The first Articles of War for the .Royal Navy were approved about l66l.
The articles were an amalgamation of pertinent instructions that had been
promulgated by admirals in command. In 17^9 a new set of Articles of War







5of l66l by specifying offenses and puirislunents in much more detai
death penalties were incorporated into these regulations which undoubted.'
accounts for the numerous death penalties in the old Articles for
Government of the Navy of the United State:
,
The first articles of naval law for the American navy were drawn up
by John Adams who, although not a mariner, was a lawyer with a reen interest
in maritime law and was familiar with the admiralty law of England.
articles were entitled the Rules for the Regulation of the Navy of the United
Colonies and were approved by the Continental Congress in 1775- Constitut-
ing about fort;, paragraphs and being very fragmentary, these articles gen-
erally defined the rights and duties of the officers, and certain punish-
ments for infractions of discipline were delineated. It is interesting to
note some excerpts from these articles. The third article read:
If any shall be heard to swear, curse or blaspheme the name of Sod,
the Commander is strictly enjoined to punish them by causing them
to wear a wooden collar or some shameful bag, for so long a time
as he shall judge proper. 10
The fourth article read:
No commander shall inflict any punishment upon a seaman beyond twelve
lashes upon his bare back with a cat-o' nine-tails; if the fault shall
deserve a greater punishment, Vie is to apply to the Commander-in-Chief
of the Navy in order to the trying of him by a Court Martial, and in
the meantime he may put him under confinement .
H
Although the articles of 1775 showed some amelioration in the eli-
mination of inhumane practices, the authority of the Commanding Officer





^William Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents (Washington: Government




A navy is essentially and necessarily aristocratic. True as may be
the political principles for which we are now contending they can
never be practically applied or even admitted on board ship, out of
port or off soundings. This may seem a hardship, but it is neverthe-
less the simplest of truths. Whilst the ships sent forth by the
Congress may and must fight for the principles of human rights and
republican freedom the ships themselves must be ruled and commanded
at sea under a system of absolute despotism.
The small but effective Continental Navy fought and lived under the
articles of 1775« These articles were used until the adoption of the Con-
stitution in I787 created the United States of America. The Constitution
,
by Article I, Section 8, endowed the new Congress of the United States with
power
:
"To provide and maintain a Navy"
"To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval forces"
After the Revolutionary War the Continental Navy was abolished, and
a new navy did not appear until the frigates UNITED STATES, CONSTITUTION,
and CONSTELLATION were commissioned in 1797 to protect our shipping in the
Mediterranean against the Barbary pirates. With ships in commission, Con-
gress in 1797 adopted the articles of 1775 > modified to meet the exigencies
of changing times and conditions. These--regulations were entitled, Articles
for the Government of the Navy of the United States and existed under this
title until superceded in 1951 by the Uniform Code of Military Justice . 3
Like the articles of 1775? the new regulations drew their authority from
the Constitution, were severe and conferred absolute authority upon the
Naval Leadership (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1939) s P« xvi.
^Organization and Functions of the Office of the Judge Advocate
General (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, I96I;, p. 2.

commanding officer of a naval vessel. Flogging was authorized for profane
swearing or drunkerness.
From the adoption of the Articles for the Government of the Navy in
1797 to their demise in 1951, there is a gradual shift away from the author-
itarian discipline and absolutism of authority that characterized the British,
Colonial, and American navies of the eighteenth century. In late November
181*2 aboard the U.S. brig SOMERS enroute from Liberia to New York, Midship-
man Phillip Spencer, son of the Secretary of War, and two seamen were hanged
at the yardarm for attempting to incite a mutiny. This death sentence was
carried out after a proper trial under the Articles for the Government of
the Navy . Upon docking in New York Commander Alexander Mackenzie, U.S.N.
,
Commanding Officer of SOMERS, was charged with murder through political
efforts of the Secretary of War. Commander Mackenzie was honorably acquit-
ted after a long trial. ^ The controversy and publicity of this trial in
effect brought to an end the summary execution of convicted naval personnel
at sea. The execution of Midshipman Spencer was the last of its kind to be
recorded in the annals of the U.S. Navy.
About this same time, Captain Uriah P. Levy, a Jewish chaplain in
the U.S. Navy, began his efforts to have flogging abolished in the U.S.
Navy. As indicated earlier, flogging had been authorized in the original
Articles for the Government of the Navy . In 1800 the total number of
lashes was limited to 100 and not more than twelve were to be applied at
any one time. ° The Naval Appropriations Act of August 3, 18^-8 directed
the Secretary of the Navy to report to Congress the number of persons
•^"Flogging In The Navy ," JAG Journal, October, 1951, p. 10.
15Lovette, p. 2^6.
1 r
JAG Journal, October, 1951, P- 10.

3flogged in the nav.y in 1846 and iQk'i . This a.ct was a direct result
of the public clamor against flogging which developed mostly thro..,
the efforts of Chaplain Levy . Tne following are excerpts from some of
the reports received in response to the Naval Appropriations Act of
8
1
Cursing the Corporal Lashes
Being Lousey 6 lashes with the cat
Stealing wig from Major Ringold 12 lashes with the cat"
In I65O Senator John Hale (New Hampshire) added an anti-flogging
clause to the Naval Appropriations Bill . In 1851-53 > Commodore
Stockton, Senator from California, further restricted flogging by legis-
lation, and on July 17, I00Z Congress abolished flogging completely.
is gradual erosion of absolutism and unchecked authority continued
throughout the latter half of the nineteenth centry and into the twentieth
century. Almost imperceptibly the basis of authority and discipline became
less authoritarian, and more thought and effort were devoted to perserving
the dignity and protecting the feelings of the enlisted man in the United
States Navy. In 1922 the United States Naval Academy initiated a formal
course in leadership. The following is taken from the textbook used in
this pioneer course in leadership:
There are various ways of securing discipline. There is the
discipline based upon the fear of the consequences of its violation -
the discipline of fear. There is what we like to consider as the
American ideal of discipline - a cheerful and spontaneous discipline
to which men willingly and galdly subject themselves out of the
faith in the cause for which they are striving and out of respect
for the complete confidence in their leaders.
Discipline of fear alone will not work well with American per-
sonnel. The average American boy of eighteen or twenty that chooses
-




the Navy for a career has been reared in an atmosphere of intellectual
and personal freedom, has been reasonably well educated, and has become
habituated to forming his own opinions of affairs in general. His
actions on the whole have been regulated chiefly by his ambition and
the contents of his poc^etbook. No doubt the great majority have a
firm faith in the American ideal of survival of the fittest and even-
tual triumph of merit.
Officers must realize that in their relations with the blue -.jackets
of today they are dealing with intelligent and ambitious men who, as a
rule, are anxious to make good.-
1
^
The inductions of millions of civilians into the armed forces during
World War II brought about changes in the military system of authority and
discipline. This massive buildup of personnel brought to the surface the
discontent and dissatisfaction that was being felt in the armed services.
In response to these pressures, Secretary of War Patterson in late 19^+5
ordered a board convened headed by Lieutenant General Haines H. Doolittle to
investigate the officer-enlisted man relationship in the Army. The board
met during the Spring of 19^+6 and concerned itself primarily with an examin-
ation of the complaints and comments on the lac] of democracy in the Army,
instances of incompetent leadership, and abuses of privileges. The Doolittle
Board delivered its final report to the Secretary of War on 20 May 19^-6.
One of the most important conclusions was, "There is a need for a new philo-
sophy in military order, a policy of treatment of men, especially in the
rank! in terms of advanced concepts in social thinking. The present iyat
does not permit full recognition of the dignity of man. More definite pro-
tection from the arbitrary acts of supervisors is essential."' The effects
of the recommendations and conclusions were far reaching and were felt in




Board Asks for More Pay, Liberal Retirements", Army-Navy Jourrial
,
June 1, 19I+6, p. Il60.

10
activity which eventually led to the adoption of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice in 1951 • Far sighted and enlightened officers in the
Navy also recognized the need for a new social philosophy on authority
and discipline. The following has been taken from an address by Admiral
R. B. CARNEY, USN (Ret) to students of the Naval War College:
World War II brought about some drastic changes in concept with res-
pect to command qualifications and the exercise of command. The rap-
idly expanding services brought an influx of patriotic citizens rally-
ing to the flag, civilians at heart, unaccustomed to the regimentation
of military life. Here, again, the importance of leadership as opposed
to the stark command was obvious. Captain Bligh relied upon seaman-
ship, aloofness, nerve, and the cat of nine tails. Today as things
have evolved in our services, Commanders no longer have unquestioned
Olympian life-and-death authority, and leadership is needed to inspire
the sort of loyalty and confidence which can compel intelligent men
obediently to follow. The Uniform Code of Military Justice by its
restrictions on authority of the individual, imposes an obligation
for leading by precept and intelligence not laid down even as recent-
ly as World War II. ^-L
The adoption of the Uniform Code of Mil itary Justice in 1951 was
a giant step away from discipline founded on authoritarianism. The new
code reflected the intentions of Congress to provide:
1. Additional safeguards against the exercise of undue control by
convening authorities.
2. That enlisted men for the first time could sit as members of
court martials of other enlisted men.
3. That an enlisted man for the first time could appeal to the next
higher authority the punishment awarded by his commanding officer.
k. That confinement on bread and water except on board ships at
sea be abolished. 2
21R. B. Carney, "Evolutionary Aspects of Command", Naval War Colleg e
Review
,
September, 19o3, p. 3-
2




It is easily discernible that the authority of the commanding officer
.•as considerably reduced when the Unifoi^n Code of Military Justice was
adopted.
This reduction in authoritarianism has continued after World War II
and is discernible from a number of vantage points. The "beast barrack"
and ' shock treatment" concepts are being replaced at recruit training
centers by a more humane and signified assimilation philosophy that is
oriented toward the team concept of warfare.
The gradual closing of the uniform and privilege gap between the
officers and enlisted men is indicative of the shift in the basis of
authority from status toward morale. ^ At present, the Navy is seriously
considering eliminating one of the most obvious authoritarian status symbols,
the time honored Jumper, Bell Bottom Trouser, and Sailor Cap; a new enlisted
man's uniform similar to that worn by officers is currently being worn and
evaluated aboard designated stations and ships in the fleet.
Ceremonialism, another manifestation of the authoritarian attitude,
was dealt a blow during World War II from which it has never recovered.
Great numbers of ceremonial practices and all types of dress uniforms
were discarded during the war. Attempts were made to restore "things to
normal" after the war, but they were never completely successful.
The evolution of the new social philosophy in the Navy was reflect-
ed in the late fifties when a change in fitness report forms made it manda-
tory to comment on whether the officer being evaluated achieved his goals
with little or no regard for the dignity and feelings for the people who
worked for him.
"Korris Janowitz, Sociology and the Military Establishment (New Yr
Russel Sage Foundation, 1959)? P- 15.

In 196.3 the Sec of tlv in response to a change
concept from, "confinement" Listed personnel to a new more bentd
philosophy of "correctional custody" issued instructions which demonstrate
octal philosophy of authority and discipline. The followl
statements apply to enlisted personnel undergoing "correctional custom
Each offender will be assigned a. counselor, on a collateral duty
basis, who should be a mature member of the command. The assigned
counselor should interview the man, observe and keep an informal
record of his progress, and make recommendations to the command-
ing officer with regard to his eventual disposition. The counselor
will -'hen appropriate, refer the man to other members of the com-
mand if their specialized assistance is needed in correcting the
causes of the offenses. c- ;
Before moving on to the next chapter to try to determine why this
change in discipline and authority has taken place, it is considered appros
to conclude this chapter with the following statement of Dr. Janowitz:
"There has been a change in the basis of authority and discipline in
the military establishment, a shift from authoritarian domination to
greater reliance on manipulation, persuasion, and group consensus. The
organization revolution which pervades contemporary society, and which
implies management by means of persuasion, explanation, and expertise
..pii
is also to be found in the military. "
Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (Clcncoe, Illinois:
The Free Press, i960), p.

CHAPTER II
UNDERLYING CAUSES BEHIND THE SHIFT
IN THE BASIS OF
AUTHORITY

UNDERLYING CAUSES BEHIND THE SHIFT IN THE BASIS OF AUTHORITY
In the previous chapter ia I to show that the very
basis of authority end discipline has undergone a metamorphosis which is
still in the evolutionary stag-:. The purpose of this chapter if to attempt
to isolate and examine some of the major causes for this evolution of au-
thority and discipline philosophy.
The evolving shift in the philosophy of authority and discipline in
the United States Navy has paralleled the organization and social revolu-
tion which the civilised world has experienced. The civilized community
has made great progress in bridging the gap between the old world view
where individuals are cells in a greater organism, naturally dependent,
obedient, and controlled by strong authority,, and the new world where
every human being is naturally self-controlling and the best conditions
are those which interfere the least with the individual's exercise of
natural freedoms. One hundred fifty years ago, Americans recognized that
all men are free and organized our democratic system in a fashion to re-
strict the government. Consequently, as men became more enlightened, more
civilized and less brutal in their relations with each other, the discipline
and authority of the naval service became more humanitarian and less author-
itarian.
^-Rose Wilder Lane, Ihe Discovery of Freedom (New York:





The i; on in I of th< I '.eenth
accentuated man's ~'" : bo threw chain* of mechanistic
hority. During the 1930's studies by behavioral scientists of the
ccr wry workers labored had a profound and last-
ing effect on the treatment of the enlisted persosne] of the U.S. Navy.
Tnz ence of the n abor unions and collective bargaining was
anot s1 ep forward In the elimination of authoritariai Men could
no longer be treated under the outdated concept of total authority. Man
Olving I state of truly being free. Hie social and cultural
revolution left its Imprint on the U.S. Navy. Although lagging in the
changes which pervaded contemporary society, nevertheless the Navy slowly
changed its attitude toward total authority and domination.
The youths of today are reared in a democratic and prosperous environ-
ment, are intelligent and well educated, and are an altogether different
group from the youths that were inducted into the Navy 50 years ago. In
1965 ?S.1<$ of the enlisted personnel in the Navy had graduated from grade
school, 5^-5% had graduated from high school and 5»9$ bad completed some
college. ^ The youth of today due to his environment and intelligence
cannot be effectively led through the use of authoritarian methods. In
a test conducted several years ago using Naval aviation cadets, an attempt
WM made to determine if the more authoritarian cadets would be chosen as
military leaders by their potential followers. The results clearly indi-
cai s authoritarian personality is less likely to be chosen as leader.
The conclusions indicated that authoritarians are individuals who are un-
eble to deal effectively with the needs of others and therefore tend to
'Uayne Hawkins (ed), Uniformed Services Almanac
,
(Washington: Moore
Inc., 1 p. 15;.
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be rejected as leaders by potential followers. This might be indicative
of a lack of social intelligence by authoritarians. 3 That the modern
sailor bears little resemblance to his former counterpart is described
as follows in the The Naval Officers Guide;
Who are the American bluejackets? First of all, the vast majority
of American bluejackets, the non-rated seamen, are better educated
and more intelligent than in former years. They have been taught
to use their mind constructively and when properly trained, they
can trouble shoot and repair complicated equipment aboard ship
which would baffle many college trained engineers. On the other
hand, many of them are more demanding of their rights and insist
on "democratic treatment" - some of the less well adjusted even
deny the necessity of military authority as a concept . . .
Many non-rated men are in the Navy "just for the ride" to per-
form their required service and no more . . . Though their greater
intelligence maJke them easier to instruct and train they are harder
to handle. The challenge to the junior officer is with him every
moment of his working day. He must employ all the tools of good
leadership and develop to the maximum his skill in human relations .
They are representative young Americans who are willing (but
not eager) to do their bit, are ready to follow direction and accept
necessary privations but will resist autocratic regimentation with
democratic fervor. They are too intelligent to follow blindly
wherever they are led, too imbued with a sense of Tightness to be
driven . . .
Military discipline and autocratic authority of a military
society are foreign to our democratic youths.
In addition to altering the rules of authority and employing more
effective leadership techniques in order to accomodate the changing man
due to the social and the organization revolution, other factors have
played a major role in the evolution of authority and discipline in the
Navy. The complex war machines of 1965 make it mandatory to achieve
genuine cooperation in team evolutions in order to achieve our military
objectives. The authoritarian variety of discipline and leadership does
^E. P. Hollander, 'Authoritarianism and Leadership in a Military
Setting", Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology
,
July, 195^, p. 3^9.
^Arthur A. Ageton and William P. Mac]-, 'The Naval Officers Guide
,
(Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, i960), p. 173-
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not achieve the same degree of coop*. . as does a more democratic
variety. This statement had credence lent to it by a feci q bo l.'lA
freshman psychology students at the University of North Carolina. After
being lis Into twelve authoritarian groups and twelve democratic
f>upgj the students vere tested in problem solving that required genuine
group cooperation. The results clearly indicated that the authoritarian
groups made more errors than did the democratic groups. 5 Mar. Moser, a
German psychologist said:
The main problems of modern military leadership are focused in the
cohesion of groups and cohesion of tactical action. The principle
of subordination is no longer sufficient and is ineffective because
leadership is decentralized through necessity and coercion of a
situation. Therefore it must be replaced by the principle of
integration which creates:
(1) rank order among members of a group and
(2) aims at the realization of three goals
(a) human integration into a fighting community
(b) insight into the coherence of military situations and
intentions.
(..'.) every soldier, especially the lower and lowest leaders must
be enabled to make meaningful and considerate decisions on
his own by taving into ^account situations, goals, and neigh-
bor in; >ing units.
The technology of warfare is so complex that the coordination of a. com-
plex group of specialists cannot be guaranteed by authoritarian discipline,
Table 2-1 depicts the growing percentage of naval enlisted personnel who
are moving into the technical and scientific areas of occupational group-
ings within the Navy. Members of a military group recognize their greater
mutual dependence on the technical proficiency rather than on a formal
authority structure. ' The high speed nuclear attack submarine and the
^Herbert W. Eber, "Problem Solving by Small Groups Under Varying
Conditions of Personality and Organization", The American Psychologist
,
July, 1952, p. 263.
-
Max Moser, "Neue Probleme Der Militarischen Funrung", Soziale
Welt
, 1953, p. 326.
; Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, kl

carrier based supersonic all weather Jet interceptor are two les
Of war machi :erc precision and team vox- is o prerequisite Cor
survival end succe.
As an adjunct to teamvorh, the successful sailor of today must
possess a high degree of initiative. Although there have been greet
changes in the military system, the organization prototype and the
real character of the nav denization is found in the combat unit.
During actual combat the maintenance of intiative is much more important
than the rigid enforcement of discipline.





OCCUPATIONAL GROUPING OF UNITED STATES NAVY ENLISTED PERSONNEL1
Item Civil Spanish - World rM Korean
War Amer. War War I War II War
Personnel-Numbcr &M5 22, 509,051 fc,lf 1,177,000
Enlisted Personnel
Occupational
Groupin, 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Technical &
Scientific .15 • 53 .66 10.4 12.7
Administrative
& Clerical '7 3." ! 7. 12.6 18.1
Mechanics ft
Repairmen .10 .95 S.i+9 16.6 15.3
Craftsmen .50 .14 13.03 55- 4.7
Service
Workers 2.4.1 6.49 12.52 9.6 12.4
Operators &




Classified 93-20 86.59 3fc.ll 38.80 30.3
baleen from: Statistical Abstract of United States : 1964
(Wr;, ioni U.£. Government Pri )ffice), Enlisted Personnel
Occupational Grouping, p. 263.
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Thia emphaaia on initiative has been recognized for some time. Durln
World War II t te Japanese trained their soldiers in Formosa to act self-
reliantly and independently, and Hitler's system taught the individual
)German private to be self-controlling, self-reliant, and responsible.'
General S. L. A. Marshall stated: "The philosophy of discipline has
adjusted to the changing conditions. As more and .ore impact has gone
into the hitting power of weapons, necessitating ever widening deploy-
ments in the forces of battle, the quality of initiative has become
the most praised of the military virtues."
With the advent of the atomic and space age, the military has be-
come more civilianized and consequently less authoritative and domineer-
ing in the concept of discipline and authority. The complexity of the
machinery of war and the requirements of research, development and techni-
cal maintenance tend to weaken the operational boundary between the mili-
tary and the non-military since the maintenance of new weapons requires a
greater reliance on civilian oriented technicians. Of all the services
the Navy has felt this civilianizing effect the least because the very
nature of shipboard life creates an entity which is normally beyond the
sphere of civilian influence. However, as the ships are fitted out wi
more complicated equipment, civilian technicians go to sea with the ships
to assist the crew in ironing out the "bugs" in systems. This relation-
ship spans the gap between the military and civilian worlds and contributes
toward the civilianization of the Navy.
•
?Lane, 2^0.








Prior to World War II when the Navy was small, the naval community
was almost self-contained. The entire population of an activity usually
lived on the base in public quarters, shopped on the base at the Navy
Exchanges and bought the food supplies at the base commissary. Enter-
tainment was provided by the base movies and the enlisted men's and
officer's clubs. Thus the entire population was capsulized within
Navy activities and had little or no social or business intercourse
with the civilian members of the community. With the rapid expansion
of personnel during World War II and the subsequently large military
force required to meet the Cold War commitments after the war, this
cocoon type of existence has largely disappeared except at overseas
bases. This has lead to a. broadening of ideas by the military com-
munity and this civilianization has added to the steady erosion of
the authoritative concept of discipline.
Another big obstacle between the military and civilian populace
was the rapid expansion and equally rapid dismantlement of the navsl
establishment during and after periods of world wide conflicts. This
cyclic nature of the size of the naval establishment in the past had
instilled the feeling that the American public deserted the military
after the war was over. Rudyard Kipling in his poem "Tommy" expressed
the feeling perfectly when he wrote:
it's Tommy this, an 'Tommy that, an'
'Tommy, go away';
But it's 'Thank you, Mister Atkins, ' when
the band begins to play"
URudyard Kipling, Departmental Ditties and Ballards and Barrack
Room Ballards (New York: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1912), p. l'+6.
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However, since the late forties and the beginning of the Cold War, the
size of the United States Navy has remained relatively stable. See
Table 2 for a summary of the number of personnel on active duty in the
Navy for the past fifteen years. This new stability has removed much
of the bitterness from the civilian-military conflict and has contributed
to a closer relationship between the Navy and the civilian populace.-1-2
Prior to the explosion of the first Russian atomic bomb and the
flight of the first Russian missile, the average American felt relatively
safe from the mass destruction of war. It has been almost a hundred years
since this country had to endure the ravages of war in our own land. Death
and destruction by war was an experience that most of our population had
never experienced. Today a totally different situation faces the inhabit-
ants of this land. In event of a nuclear exchange with Russia, the civil-
ian faces the same if not greater risks than do the military. The develop-
ment of intercontinental ballistic missiles with 50 megaton hydrogen bomb
warheads has socialized the risks of war for civilians and military alike. 1:>
This merging of risks has brought the military closer to the civilian world
and added to the factors that are diluting the old philosophy of authoritar-
ian leadership.
The last twenty years have witnessed the rise of the United States
to a position of world leadership, and today this country has the heavi-
est load of international responsibilities in history.
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Military leaders today find themselves embroiled in complicated
military/politico situations which require broad ranges of political,
social, and economic policies. This has resulted in the military leaders
entering into arenas that in the past have been reserved for civilian
and professional politicians. This civilianization has given the leaders
many non-military jobs which involve general management skills. At the
top echelons this has caused a shift in emphasis gradually away from the
hero concept to the manager concept. This emphasis of the traditional
warrior concept has added impetus to the demise of the authoritarian
philosophy of discipline and authority. The recent retirement of Air
Force General Curtis Lemay produced the following comments in Time maga-
zine:
Without a debate or dissenting vote, the Senate last week confirmed
General J. P. McConnell, 57, as Air Force Chief of Staff and as the
newest member of the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. The event was
widely unheralded. Yet it marked the end of an era in the U. S.
Military leadership. For McConnell succeeds none other than Curtis
Lemay, last of the great combat commanders to serve on the Joint
Chiefs . . .
The new Joint Chiefs seem ideally suited to the requirements of
Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, who personally selected each.
No Defense Secretary in history has ever asserted Pentagon control
like McNamara. For his top military advisors, he wants planners
and thinkers, not heroes. He wants team men, not gladiators.
Generally speaking, up to and including World War II, the military
leaders, both Army and Navy, were allowed to run their own kind of war.
Of course, overall planning of global strategy and coordination was re-
quired and was conducted at the highest military and civilian levels.
However, the dismissal of General MacArthur by President Harry S. Truman
over disagreement on how to prosecute the Korean War in 1951 "was a fore-
warning of the mounting pressure for increased civilian control of what
The Management Team", Time Magazine, February 5, 1965, p. 22.
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had been before purely military matters. The Defense Department Reorgani -
zation Act of t • a a milestone in strengthening the office of the
Secretary of Defense and handing over the reins of military power to the
civilian heads of the defense establishment. Secretary Robert S. McNamara
since his appointment by President John F. Kennedy in i960 has increasin
ly exercised the authority made possible by the Act of 1958- Tlie vast
improvement in communications and the invention of the electronic data
computer has allowed Secretary McNamara to extend his authority into
operational matters and centralise the conduct of significant milita
operations. The new concept of Command and Control expresses the new
philosophy of centralized civilian control. "A Command and Control System
is a system that connects a commander to many sensor, support, and effector
elements in order to have all these work together in a unified, integrated,
and controlled manner toward some Otherwise unattainable goal. 5 The
urgent need for a national command and control system to enable the top
civilian and military leaders to effectively exercise centralized operational
control over significant military/politico situations was illustrated during
the Cuban Crisis of October/November 1962. In the Fall of 1962, prior to
the Cuban Crisis, the Secretary of Defense issued a directive that estab-
lished the concepts of the national Military Command System. General Paul
Tibbets, who has worked very closely with the development of this system
sa
: National Military Command System was envisioned as having the
capability to:
Provide National Command Authority (the President, Secretary of
Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff) with the exact control
of our military might that is required to protect the interests
-^Edward Bennet, James Degan, and Joseph Spiegel, (ed), Military
Information Systems (New York: Frederic 1 : A. Praeger, Inc., I96U), p. v.
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of the United States in the complex environment of a military-
political crisis situation less than a nuclear exchange.
The Cuban Crisis confirmed the need for such a system and the program
was accelerated. In February 1963, the Secretary of Defense confirmed
establishment of the National Military/ Command Center (NMCC) in the Pentagon,
organized rules for interactions between all governmental agencies and direct-
ed that significant politico/military matters be referred to the NMCC for
top level decisions. ' This system with its nerve center, NMCC, located at
the Pentagon, emconpassed the complete military spectrum, the White House,
and the State Department. It is this type of philosophy that is surely and
steadily handing over control of the military to the civilians. The extent
hich the civilisation has progressed can be illustrated by quoting part
of an editorial in the Washington Evening Star:
When a bridge is to be bombed by American pilots in Laos, it is
Defense Secretary McNamara who decides how many planes will fly
the mission, not the Air Force.
When retaliatory raids are made in North Viet Nam, it is McNamara,
the President and other civilian officials who pick the targets,
not the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
When a coast must be blockaded-Cuba to be specific -it is McNamara,
and the civilians who decode which ships shall be boarded and how
and by whom, not the admiral running the blockade
.
When the reconnaissance flights started over Laos, the Navy was
told in detail by McNamara and his advisers just how to fly them.
In other words, a military operation is controlled in its smallest
detail by civilians, not military men.-*-"
This civilianization of even the operational matters is not conducive
to the creation of an environment for total and absolute authority by
Paul W. Tibbets, "About Our Working Military Command System",





^Richard Fryklund. "Civilian Reins on Military Tighten," The
Evening Star (Washington), February l3, 1965, p. A-l8.
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military leaders at any level. In fact to make siich a complex and all
encompassing centralized system work, requires the utmost in cooperation
and coordination between all three services at even the lowest level of
authority.
In the investigation of why the basis of authority and discipline
in the Navy is moving toward a more democratic and social philosophy, it
has been shown that the social and organization revolution evolving in the
Navy is paralleling a similar revolution which is pervading society today.
It has been demonstrated that since 19^5 > this movement has gained great
impetus, due in large part of the lessons learned from World War II. It
has become apparent that as long as the armed forces must rely largely
on drafted personnel, or short term reservists who have volunteered because
of the pressures of the selective service system, the military must accomo-
date itself to personnel who are essentially civilians. This constant flow
of civilians in and out of the ranks of the military is a powerful influence
against military traditionalism and authoritarianism. ° Prior to World War
II, the requirements of warfare and type of individuals needed to man the
naval establishment were vastly different from those of today. Before go-
ing on to the next chapter to see how the Navy has reacted to this new
evolving social philosophy, it is considered fitting to summarize this
chapter with a statement by Admiral Carney:
New planning, new weapons, new techniques, and new technology
has changed the business of command. The post war years, have
perhaps, produced even more radical changes; unification; alli-
ances; racing technology; weapons of undreamed of lethality; and
an ever-increasing trend toward centralization ... It is equally
-^'Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, 32.
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apparent that the attributes of leadership, as opposed to raw










DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE
The founders of this great nation included within the Constitution
explicit restraints upon the military. For example, the Constitution for-
bids the appropriation of funds for the Army for more than two years at a
time. However, "it is a striking paradox that the political philosphers
of the eighteenth century America dreaded a standing Army but complacently
accepted a standing navy . . . They saw no incompatibility between the Navy
and a free political system. " The general philosophy in the early days of
this country's history was that there was little to fear from the Navy, and
consequently the Navy was left alone to conduct its affairs as it saw fit.
Tliis laissez-faire attitude persisted for a number of years. Except for
the notoriety stirred up by Chaplain Levy over the punishment by flogging
in the middle of the nineteenth century and the public interest in the
trial ox Commander MacKenzie in 18^2 for the hanging of Midshipman Spencer,
the Navy was generally left to its own devices to determine the current
philosophy on authority and discipline. Nevertheless over the years some
progress was made in humanizing the mechanistic approach to discipline.
However, during World War II, the size of the Navy increased thirty
fold, and the influx of civilians quickly pinpointed many problems in re-
gard to discipline and authority that the Navy had to come to grips with.
William B. Pendergast, "The Navy and Civil Liberty", United States
Naval Institute Proceedings





The problems 'uncovered, in the Army during World War II were in fact more
pronounced and more serious than those in the Navy. The Secretary of War
convened the Doolittle Board in 19^6 to look into these problems in the
Army. The Doolittle Board interviewed h2 witnesses and received more than
1,000 letter ited persons. Some of the ma
.J or conclusions and
recommendations of this board are listed below. See Appendix I for a com-
plete list of conclusions and recommendations of the Doolittle Report.
Conclusio. .
1. Americans loo:; with disfavor upon any system which grants unearned
privileges to a particular class of individuals and find distasteful
axxy tendency to ms":e arbitrary social distinctions between two parts
of the Army.
2. There ifl a need for a. new philosophy in the military order, a
policy of treatment of men, especially in the ranics, in terms of
advanced concepts of social thinking. The present system does not
permit full recognition of the dignity of man.
3. One of the most iac'-ing yet important phases of the military
structure is an alert and effective internal policing service an
an agency providing a practical means of redress.
Recommendations .
1. That steps be taken to improve leadership in the officer corps
of the Army in order that the corps will merit the respect of the
soldiers and civilians alike. The following specific actions be
Inaugurated.
a. That sufficient time be expended during orientation and in-
doctrination to inculcate thoroughly:
(1) A sound appreciation of responsibilities, and especially
to subordinates.
(2) The intelligent use of authority.
(3) The idea that privileges which accompany rank and responsi-
bility are established to better enable the individual to perform his
duties effectively and efficiently and are not for the purpose of im-
proving his own personal interest.
b. That in addition to the training in the technical stibjects,
each candidate, whether at West Point, an ROTC unit, or Officer
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Candidate School, receive much more comprehensive instruction in
command responsibility, personnel management, and human relations."
When the Doolittle Report was released to the public, some viewed it as
opening Pandora ' s box and others did not think it proved anything in
particular. The conflicting views are illustrated by quotations from
newspapers commenting on the report at the time of release:
New YorV. Times - The report of the Doolittle Board on its investiga-
tions of Army personal relationships should appeal to all ranks as
a sensible evaluation of the basic frictions that exist in the mili-
tary service.
Springfield Union - On the whole, we would say that the Doolittle
Board found little fundamentally wrong with the Army - certainly
not enough to have warranted all the furore caused by the much-
publicized criticism of a caste system which the present report
admits is non-existent.
Boston Globe - The whole tenor of the report is practical and af-
firmative.
Washington Post - Reforms recommended by the Doolittle Board consti-
tute a program of basic justice which can only result in a better sat-
isfied and hence more efficient Army.
3
The study was received with mixed emotions by the regular officers of
the Army. The following comments were made by Major General Manton S.
Eddy, Commanding General of the Third Service Command, in a speech at
Richmond, Virginia: "The distinction based upon rank is not undemocratic,
and we'd better think carefully before we destroy a good thing." Para-
doxically, shortly before the Doolittle Report was released, a severe
clamp down in discipline was put into effect upon the occupation troops
in Europe in response to disciplinary problems caused by general laxness
2
"Board Asks More Pay, Liberal Retirements," Army-Navy Journal , June
1, 1946, p. 1183.
-"*"U.S. Daily Press Views-The Doolittle Report," Army-Navy Journal
,
June 8, 1946, p. 1190.
^
"Caste System Study," Army-Navy Journal , April 13, 19^6, p. 976.
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in troop discipline. The reaction of the press throughout the country
was typical of the differences of opinion both in and out of military
circles of how the military should be disciplined.
Omaha World Herald - Soldiers who behave badly are not likely to
respond to reasons and pleas that they are representatives of the
United States and should conduct themselves accordingly. They will
improve only if they know the penalty for bad conduct will be swift
and sure.
St-Louis Post-Dispatch - More discipline probably is needed. It is
doubtful, however, if the Army's traditional idea of discipline will
suffice here. More difficult, but in the long run more effective
measures would include a program of education which goes beyond what
is being done now.
5
Although the Doolittle Report is usually credited with contributing
the major impetus toward modernizing military law, the Navy was also at-
tempting to find out where improvement and change were needed. In the
Annual Report of the Judge Advocate General to the Secretary of the Navy
in 19^6 was the following statement:
Preparatory to embarking upon a comprehensive revision of naval
law and regulations, the Judge Advocate General instituted a ser-
ies of studies and surveys as the basis of special projects present-
ly underway to accomplish revision and modernization of such basic
sources of naval law as the Articles for the Government of the Navy,
Naval Courts and Boards, and Navy Regulations.
The studies and surveys mentioned in the above statement received little
notice, either in the newspapers or throughout the services. Many of the
recommendations growing out of these studies were put into effect by ad-
ministrative action of the Navy Department. The studies included the fol-
lowing reports:
1. First Ballantine Report - 19^3
2. McGuire Report - 19^5
5
"Public Opinion," Army-Navy Journal , May k, 19^6, P« 1015.
°Ira F. Reese, LCDR, USN, "Surveying Naval Justice, Part I", JAG
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bri^ uanaril ow:
First xjoll&ntinc Report
1. No majc .. for the Government of the
1.
2. uxngea were designed primarily to minimize delay
and loss of man hours to the aery ice, while continuing all reasonable safe-




Present system of naval justice outmoded, based upon traditions
and a lagal tyaf designed ior the Civil War era.
tat tue Navy by virtue of ite primary functions cannot
adc . civilian system of .justice.
M aavy system failed to accept and safeguard certain basic rights
vital to our Anal . viewpoint.
''
Second Ballsntine Report
1. Disciplinary system in general has functioned well, but war tine
experiences indicate need for a change.
2. Articles for the Government of the Navy constitute such an important







completely. However, considerable revision is necessary to simplify and
modernize the AGN.
3. Retain present schedule Captain's Mast punishment.
h. The general belief among officers of the Navy is that fitting con-
duct of naval personnel depends on example and encouragement rather than on
infliction of penalties. This belief is in large measure responsible for
the maintenance of naval discipline at a high level. °
White Report (Conducted by a single man-Commodore Robert J. White,
Chaplain Corps, USNR. During late 19U5 and early 19U6, Chaplain White
visited all of the naval places of confinement and personally interviewed
500 prisoners.
)
1. Eighty-two per cent of men interviewed said that they had received
a fair trial. Concluded Naval justice functioned fairly in an overwhelming
proportion of cases.
2. Recommended a complete revision of Articles for the Government of
the Navy (AGN)
.
3. Incorporate in Articles for the Government of the Navy all the funda-
mental rights and privileges to which accused is now entitled, either expli-
citly or by implication. -*-1
Keefe Report
1. Very complete and exhaustive report. Did not come up with any new
ideas that were not basically covered by the other reports.
2. Strongly criticized the so called command control of court -martial
12
system, and pointed to the need for impartial judicial review.







As mentioned earlier these studies were given little or no publicity
and few officers in the Navy were aware of the efforts being made to deter-
mine and correct the inadequacies of the Articles for the Government of the
Navy . The storm of public criticism stirred up by the Doolittle Report con-
tinued during the middle and late forties. Many articles published in maga-
zines and newspapers took the Navy as well as the Army to task for the out-
moded systems of military discipline. Many of the regular officers of the
Navy felt that the criticism was largely unfair and unwarranted, and the
problem was aggravated mostly by war time sailors returning to civilian life
and "letting off steam" about their military experiences. During this period
of transition, the military periodicals were filled with articles by Navy
personnel in an attempt to fight back against what they considered unjust
criticism. Lieutenant (junior grade) Robert J. Lauer, USN made the follow-
ing points in his article of September 19^ I
1. The military is not as tyrannical as most people believe.
2. Military people are at a disadvantage. They cannot use magazines
and newspapers to publicly rebutt these criticisms.
3. The rights of men must be sacrificed without question if the exigen-
cies of the service demand it.
k. Democracy cannot function in the military sphere.
5. Men must depend upon the integrity of the officers in command.
6. There were too many part time officers in World War II. °
Boatswainmate First Class Edmund A. Gibson, USN, a veteran of 15 years at
sea made the following comments in an article in the United States Naval
Institute Proceedings ;
•^Robert J. Lauer, "In Defense of the Military," United States Naval
Institute Proceedings, September, 19^-8, p. 1136.
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It is ray honest opinion that men in the Regular Services, professional
soldiers and sailors, do not ordinarily complain about the "Caste System"
for the simple reason that they are not aware of the fact that there is
one. Speaking for Navy men, I am certain they are entirely without any
feeling of inferiority, social or otherwise to their officers.
Mi'. Gibson went on to say that he had had several opportunities to witness
a few of the so-called "democratic officers" in action. The "call me Nick
ashore boys" type of officer elicited only distrust and disgust from the
men. He said that enlisted men enjoyed their own separate places of enter-
tainment and resented it when officers came to these places. Mr. Gibson
concluded his article by asking the news media to "mind their own business"
and let the Navy handle its own affairs. ^
However, as the forties wore on, both the Army in response to the
pressures created by the Doolittle Report, and the Navy responding to its
own studies were working toward modernizing their own brand of military law.
Concurrent with the pressure to update military lav; and discipline, was the
push toward unification of the armed services. Shortly after the convening
of the 30th Congress in 19^6, the Armed Services Committee of the House of
Representatives commenced hearings on military justice. The proposed Army
Bill was passed by the House of Representatives and reached the Senate Armed
Services Committee. At the time the Army Bill reached the committee, the
committee was considering a proposed Navy bill to amend the Articles for
the Government of the Navy . Senator Chan Gurney of South Dakota realized
that the enactment of two separate bills would not be a step toward unifi-
cation. In a letter to the Secretary of Defense in May 19^G> Senator
-^Edmund A. Gibson, "More About the Caste System," United States
Naval Institute Proceedings
,
September, 19^9? P« 1005
.
15Jbid s p. 1009.
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Garney suggested a uniform code of military justice be prepared. 1^ The
Secretary of Defense, Mr. James T. Forrestal, arranged for the formation of
a "Committee on a Uniform Code of Military Justice" and on August 18, l.QkQ
forwarded a precept reading in part as follows:
The tas". of the Committee is to draft, in time for submission to
the olst Congress, a uniform code of military justice applicable to
the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force.
The Code should be drafted so as to be uniform in substance and
uniform in application and interpretation. It should protect the
rights of those subject to the Code, with the view of increasing
public confidence in military justice, and without impairing the
performance of military functions.
In drafting the new Code the Committee shall consult with such
persons in the Armed Forces as it may wish and invite the views of
such individuals and organisations from outside the National Mili-
tary Establishment as it may desire. •*-?
The Committee consisted of the following members:
Professor Edmund M. Morgan, Harvard Law School - Chairman
Mr. W. John Kenney - Under Secretary of the Navy
Mr. Gordon Gray - Assistant Secretary of the Army
Mr. Eugene Zuckert - Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
-| Q
Representatives of all services
This committee went into conference during the Summer of 19^8 and submitted
the proposed UCMJ to Congress in February 19^9* On 5 May 1950 President
Truman affixed his signature to the Uniform Code of Military Justice , and
the armed services had a new code of law. The bill provided for the new
l6
H. J. Webb, CDR, USCG, "Uniform Code of Military Justice," United
States Naval Institute Proceedings
,







code to become effective 31 May 1951 > providing twelve months during
which the services could prepare manuals of court martial procedure under
the new law and indoctrinate their personnel in the changes brought about.
The Navy had the greater number of changed procedures, because the Uniform
Code of Military Justice adopted the framework of the army court martial
system, together with its legal terminology.
It became evident upon reading the new code that the authority of
the commanding officer had been severely restricted in contrast to the
Articles for the Government of the Navy . Commander Henry J. Cappello, USN,
said:
In spite of the many changes wrought by the UCMJ and the ill advised
endeavors of some people unfamiliar with the necessities of military
organizations and discipline to abrogate entirely the Commanding Of-
ficer's authority to impose punishment, "Mast" remains the Navy's
Commanding Officer's most important tool for the enforcement of dis-
cipline and enhancement of morale. 20
Commander Cappello ' s opinion of the inadequacy of the authority of the com-
manding officer under the new law was shared by most line officers. As the
new code began to be tested by time and use, the Army and Air Force came to
the same conclusion. The Uniform Code of Military Justice had curtailed
the authority of the commanding officer to an extent which was hindering
the commanding officer in carrying out his responsibilities. In the 1955
Annual Report of the United States Court of Military Appeals and Judge
Advocate Generals of the Armed Forces and the General Counsel of the
Treasury representing the Coast Guard, it was agreed that the power of the
commanding officer should be increased. During the Summer of 1955 > &
proposal to amend the Uniform Code of Military Justice was forwarded to





Congress by the Department of Defense. Some of the more significant changes
recommended were:
A commanding officer exercising general court-martial authority could
impose on an officer or warrant officer of his command forfeiture of one
half of his pay per month for a period not to exceed three months, instead
of the presently authorized one month.
A commanding officer could confine an enlisted man of his command for
a period not to exceed seven consecutive days, and there would be no require-
ment that the enlisted man be aboard ship.
A commanding officer would also have the power to impose on an en-
listed man of his command forfeiture of one-half of one month's pay for a
22
period not to exceed three months.
Eight years later, Executive Order No. 11081 of 29 Jamxary 1963 amended
Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice as follows:
A commanding officer exercising general court-martial authority could
impose on an officer or warrant officer of his command forfeiture of one
half of his pay per month for a period not to exceed two months. (Three
months had been requested.)
A commanding officer, if imposed upon a person attached to a ship,
could order confinement on bread and water or diminished rations for not
more than three days. If imposed by a Lieutenant Commander or above, a
commanding officer could impose correctional custody for not more than 30
days. (Congress refused to give commanding officers not aboard ship the
authority to confine enlisted men on bread and water and restricted the
commanding officer of a ship to issue a bread and water punishment for
22
"JAG Bulletin Board", JAG Journal, July, 1955, p. 2.
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only three days. In place of the concept of confinement, a concept of
correctional custody was substituted and a maximum punishment of 30 days
was authorised.)
A commanding officer could impose upon an enlisted man in his com-
mand forfeiture of not more than one-half of one month's pay per month
for two months. (Three months had been requested). ^
Although it took almost eight years for Congress to reverse some of the
original concepts of the UCMJ, in general tne authority of the commanding
officer was increased as requested.
It has developed in this chapter that the Navy, due primarily to
the tremendous influx of civilians into the armed services during World
War II, slowly realized the need for updating and amending the Articles
for the Government of the Navy . Within the Navy, studies were conducted
to determine the proper direction to head in modernizing Naval law. Many
improvement which did not require Congressional action were made in the AGN
through internal administrative action by the Navy Department. However,
as a result of the Navy studies, amendments to the Articles for the Govern-
ment of the Navy were submitted to Congress. Unification pressures during
the same time frame aborted the Navy's attempts to revise and modernize
the AGN and the idea of a uniform code of military justice was born. New
concepts in military law as expressed by the Uniform Code of Military Justice
were not the only answers to the evolving new philosophy of authority and
discipline. The next chapter will attempt to discuss some of the other
means that were developed by the Navy to adjust to the new social philosophy
that was emerging within the Navy.
23
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IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW PHILOSOPHY
The new Uniform Code of Military Justice gave the Navy the formal
expression of the new social philosophy which was changing the basis of
authority and discipline in the Navy. However, other factors were germane
to the evolution of a basis of authority founded on authoritarism to a new
philosophy more democratic in nature. This change had been gradual in
nature and many means were used to assimilate this shift in emphasis.
"As the excessively harsh discipline declined, athletics have taken over,
since a sport involves a team spirit, and is appropriate preparation for
military life.' The big shift in emphasis toward athletics began at the
turn of the century, as the team concept began to grow in importance. The
first football game between the Naval Academy and the Military Academy was
played 29 November I89O. Score Navy-24, Army-0. 2 The importance of
athletics gradually spread throughout the service, and soon penetrated the
enlisted ranks. It has progressed to a point today where at the service
academies and major commands, it approaches semi-professionalism. The
Naval Academy football team in 1963 was rated the number two team in the
nation by the Associated and United Press polls. Navy's quarterback that
year, Roger Staubach, was awarded the Heisman Trophy, an award given an-
nually to the nation's outstanding football player. The tremendous emphasis
•J-Janowitz, The Professional Soldier
,
p. 1
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on athletics reaches down to the smallest ships in commission, and the
success and reputation of the ship's athletic teams has a measureable
effect on the crew's morale and overall efficiency of the unit. The
importance of athletics is stressed at every level in the Navy's chain of
command and has done much to develop a team spirit concept. It is well
known throughout the Navy that many of the leaders at all levels were out-
standing athletes at the Naval Academy or at civilian colleges. A signi-
ficant number of Flag Officers in the Navy today were outstanding athletes
at the Naval Academy.
The United States Naval Academy, which more than any other institution
reflects the leadership philosophy of the Navy, has slowly withdrawn from
a concept of mechanistic authority to one which emphasizes persuasion and
manipulative skills. The lessons learned from World War II made it obvious
that the curriculum at the Naval Academy would have to be altered to provide
training in interpersonal skills. The author can remember his own experi-
ences at the Naval Academy during the end of the war and after. It was a
period of severe conflict between the traditionalists and the more enlighten-
ed naval officers. The environment of the school reflected this discord.
The author recalls an incident during which a minor infraction of the rules
resulted in 1200 plebes (freshmen) having to stand at attention for three
hours until the individual who committed the offense confessed to the duty
officer. Hazing and physical punishment were still the modus operandi by
which the new plebes were assimilated into the military environment. One
of the first experiences each new plebe underwent was the "haircut," the
hair being cut until it was one-half inch in length.
The next four years saw a gradual inching away from the traditional
authoritarian concept of authority and discipline. IXiring the author's
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second year at the Naval Academy, a new superintendent arrived who began to
make changes. The physical punishment and hazing were declared against re-
gulations. Midshipmen were granted more time off to mix with the civilian
populace, and this did much to civilianize the institution. Leadership
courses were emphasized utilizing the case method. Paradoxically, the au-
thor can remember taking an enlightened course in leadership which was taught
by an officer who was a martinet of the old school in every sense of the word.
The instructor suffered as much, if not more, than his neophyte students.
This situation was typical of the conflict between the old and the new
which was raging. However, progress was being made and "since 1955? applied
courses in human relations and group psychology have been offered at all
three service academies, and stand as a testment to the fact that the re-
quirements of the organizational revolution have penetrated the military
profession". 3 Today a midshipman in his junior year at the Naval Academy
is required to take course number "C 306," "introduction to Military Psy-
ii h
chology and Management . This is a 2.5 semester hour course which is des-
cribed as "Introduction to the study of psychological measurement, person-
ality and social influences in behavior". ' In addition course number C 805
"Military Psychology" is offered as an elective. This course is described
as "A study of those aspects of social psychology applicable to the mili-
tary including basic psychological factors, social attitudes, the social
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and cultural habitat, military organizations as social systems, leadership
groups, and individual role behavior and personality in military groups."'
Since World War II the Navy has recruited and trained the majority of
its officers through the medium of the Naval Reserve Officer Taining Corp
program. In fact, the services are looking more each year to civilian ed-
ucational institutions as a primary source of active duty and career offi-
8
cers. The NROTC or HOLLOWAY Program for officers offers a four year edu-
cation at one of 52 universities throughout the country. In 1959 & course
in basic psychology was included in the Hollo-way Program curriculum. This
was done in consonance with the Navy's new leadership concept that a better




World War II also witnessed the beginning of the use of psychologists
by the Navy. During World War II, psychologists were primarily used for
personnel selection. Since the war, the use of psychologists has become
much more systematic and broader in scope. In 1957? 5$ of the members of
10
the Association of American Psychologists were at work on military problems.
In 19^6 the Navy established what is now the Psychological Sciences Division
of the Office of Naval Research. Under the auspices of this division con-
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Psychological Science Division of The Office of Naval Research (ONR)
was supporting 1U3 separate contracts for research and development in
the various fields of psychology. The cost of these contracts to the
Navy was $2,000,000 anually. 2 Representative of these contracts is
"A Study of Leadership Among Submarine Officers" by Donald T. Campbell
of Ohio State University. This study is concerned with "the problem of
the criteria in leadership studies and the relation of these criteria to
a number of variables which describe what the leaders do and how they do
it." 3 The use of psychologists by the Navy is well established and by
the virtue of good relations within the Navy organization and good out-
come of contract programs, the confidence level of psychologists is high
within the Office of Naval Research. In the community of scientists
throughout the country, the confidence level in ONR is also high.
In 1950 Admiral Arleigh Burke became concerned over the vast
numbers of technically competent men leaving the Navy. He personally
conducted an exhaustive study to find out why. Most of the 10,000
separatees questioned indicated they were leaving out of "sheer disgust".
They felt their jobs were unimportant and got no satisfaction from doing
them. Nearly 7,000 men were convinced that both their immediate and
superior officers were entirely uninterested in them as human beings with
individual inspirations and problems. This was the beginning of a pro-
gram which culminated on May 17> 1958 with the unexpected issue of General
12Ibid.
^Donald T. Campbell, "A Study Of Leadership Among Submarine Officers
(Columbus: The Ohio State University Research Foundation, 1953)
ll+John G. Hubbell, "Moral Build-Up Gives New Strength to the Navy",




Order 21 on Armed Forces Day to every commanding officer in the Naval
Establishment by Thomas S. Gates, Secretary of the Navy. See Appendix
for complete text of General Order 21. The order defined leadership
as:
The art of accomplishing the Navy's mission through people. It
is the sum of those qualities of intellect, of human understand-
ing and moral character that enable a man to inspire and to man-
age a group of people successfully. Effective leadership, there-
fore, is based on personal example, good management practices, and
moral responsibility. 5
The general order went on to state the objective of this order was:
To reemphafize and revitalize Naval Leadership in all its aspects:
inspirational, technical, and moral. Combat readiness requires
that all persons in authority observe in themselves the standards
of moral behavior and devotion to duty laid down in Navy Regula-
tions. The Navy must also develop and use new concepts of man-
agement and executive development to ensure efficiency and the
best use of people. 1"
The general order was shortly implemented by the Chief of Naval Personnel
who established leadership schools for officers and petty officers at
key locations throughout the country, set up a leadership group in Wash-
ington which coordinated mobile leadership teams to aid commanding officers
requesting help in setting up their programs, and sent (personally signed)
letters to each prospective commanding officer emphasizing the importance
of good leadership and the significance of General Order 21. ' See
Appendix IV for letter received by author prior to taking command of sub-
marine CUBERA.
In 1958 the Chief of Naval Personnel established three Petty Officer
Leadership Schools. These schools were located at Norfolk, San Diego, and
^Navy Department General Order Number 21 of 1? May 1958? par. k.
l6Ibid, par. 5.
"I ry
Department of the Navy Leadership Group, Proceedings, February I96O -
January 1961 (Washington, 1961), p. vi.
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Great Lakes. This small nucleus quickly expanded until today there are
65 such schools for petty officers, officers, and in some cases mixed
classes of petty officers and officers. Courses in these schools vary
in length from two days to four weeks, but in all of them the curriculum
emphasizes psychology and human relations. Typical of these schools is
the Leadership Academy at the Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, Virginia
which in March this year "graduated 2? students from its Petty Officer
Leadership Academy, the 43rd such class to complete the four week course
since it was started in 1959*
Shortly after the promulgation of General Order 21, the Chief of
Naval Personnel established a small, permanent leadership staff in Wash-
ington, D.C., and set up the Leadership Field Teams in various areas to
serve as extensions of this staff. The staff produces and distributes
materials in the form of books, pamphlets, curricula, check-lists, articles,
movies, and tapes, built around the use of the guided discussion as a
leadership tool supplemental to the exercise of the principles and prac-
20
tices of good leadership. Seven teams, each consisting of a senior
officer and a chief petty officer were trained to show Naval Officers
and petty officers how to implement the new leadership program. The plan
was simple. Officers implementing the program were given thirty discussion
guides, each designed to reach the core of a vital subject within ten to
twenty minutes. The chiefs were required to arrange their division work
schedules so as to fit in two of these discussions each week.
-'-Department of the Navy Leadership Working Group, Proceedings
February 1961 -January 1964 (Washington, 1964), p. 13-6.
^"Leadership Academy Graduates 43rd Class," Navy Times
, 3 March
1965, p. E-4.






The first objective of the leadership course was to train officers
to help their men gain a perspective on themselves. Early sessions deal-
ing with the dignity, importance, responsibility and rights of the individ-
ual human being would enable men to start developing a clear cut sense of
self-respect and, simultaneously, respect for and faith in their shipmates.
The men were to learn the real meaning of discipline - that is not neces-
sarily synonymous with punishment, but is an invaluable tool with which
men accomplish greatness and strive for perfection. As the men came to
realize their own value and to feel themselves part of naval tradition,
they were to be led through a fundamental understanding of the American
philosophy. 21
Since the inception of the idea, leadership field teams have visited
3,600 commands and have contacted over 232,000 people. The author, while
the commanding officer of a submarine during the period 1962-1964, had
occasion to observe the Norfolk team in action aboard his ship. Initially
some of the senior petty officers were hostile to the idea of devoting two
days listening to material they felt they already were familiar with. The
team used a "soft sell" and human relations approach, and the author was
gratified when he heard remarks at the conclusion of the course such as,
"It's the best thing that has ever happened to me in the Navy" and "Why
did the Navy take so long to start this kind of program?"
How effective has this program been since its beginning almost seven
years ago? Shortly a year after General Order 21 was issued, the Judge
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reduced the general court-martial rate from the 1$)U6-19^7 level of 12
per thousand men to 1.4 per thousand." Within six months after the new
leadership program was started, a West Coast aircraft squadron not only
increased its aircraft availability by more than fifty per cent, it made
more than half again as many of its airplanes constantly ready to fly at
an instant's notice, and increased its reenlistment rate from seven to
fifty-five per cent. Within a year the Recruit Training Center at Great
Lftkef, Illinois, halved its number of courts-martial. A major fleet air
wing at Pearl Harbor became so efficient it was able to release 150 men
for duty elsewhere. An air station in Florida saw its reenlistment rate
shoot from 1+7 per cent to 63 per cent. In a six months period at Whiting
Field, Florida, student pilots were able to fly 11,856 more training hours
oh
than during the same time period a year previous, before General Order 21. ^
The situations mentioned above represent dramatic instances where
improvement could be directly tied to General Order 21. However, the over-
all effect of General Order 21 was excellent, and the results were measure-
able to the extent that the program received command attention. Some com-
mands, particularly the small ships, were reluctant to give up the time re-
quired to properly implement the program due to an already over-burdened
schedule. However, as the program gained impetus and the results of good
active programs became Vnown, widespread acceptance and full implementation
became the rule rather than the exception.
There was actually nothing new about General Order 21. It was full of
ideas military leaders take for granted - the value of personal example;





the proposition that the more powerful weapons become, the more important
becomes the will and character of the men who must use them; the need for
good management practices - taking care of the men, and seeing that they
are content in their jobs. -^
In summary it can be said that the Navy has attempted to reflect the
changing basis of authority and discipline by encouraging participation in
athletics to foster the concept of team effort and cooperation. The cur-
riculum at the Naval Academy and at the many civilian institutions where
Naval Officers are educated has been modified to include courses on psy-
chology and leadership to help assimilate the new social philosophy. Since
World War II the Navy has been making excellent use of psychologists through
the Division of Psychological Sciences of the Office of Naval Research in
order to determine what constitutes a good leader and trying to formulate
programs which will turn out good leaders. Finally in 1958 the issuance
of General Order 21 - which outlined the education of officers and petty
officers in enlightened modern leadership techniques with the major emphasis
on human relations - was an attempt to give the Navy a vehicle with which
to implement the new social philosophy of authority and discipline
.
It has been demonstrated that the new leadership program with strong
emphasis on the dignity of man and human relations has enjoyed a degree of
success since its inception seven years ago. However, the Navy is a mix-
ture of the old and the new, and old habits and modus operandi are difficult
to discard in an organization where tradition and custom play a major role.
The next and concluding chapter will attempt to draw a few conclusions con-
cerning the status of the evolution of the basis of authority and discipline,
25Hubbell, 130.

probe Into some of the dilemmas that thio philosophy has created, and





TRENDS FOR THE FUTURE

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS, DILEMMAS, AND TRENDS FOR THE FUTURE
It it safe to conclude that the basis of authority and discipline
within the Navy has undergone a remarkable transformation. This shift
in emphasis from domination and absolutism to a form of discipline and
authority which has for its basis a more democratic philosophy, started
before World War I and evolved painfully during World War II and the
Korean Conflict.
Since the Navy is a reflection of civilian social structure to a
large degree, this transformation reflects the changes in the larger
society. Popular demand for equality of treatment has grown with in-
dustrialization. As the standard of living rises, tolerances for the
discomfits of military life decreases. The skepticism of urban life
carries over into the military to a greater degree than in previous gen-
erations, so that military personnel will not follow orders blindly, but
will demand an explanation from those in command. The emphasis on in-
dividual initiative, the demands of technical expertise, the automation
of warfare and the coordination required by a complex group of specialists
to operate our highly sophisticated war machine has doomed authoritarian
discipline.
In the Navy today, there is still a lingering traditionalist element
which views the trend toward a less authoritative form of discipline as




undermining the whole system of discipline and authority. Fortunately,
there is also a growing number of enlightened officers and petty officers
who have been trained and educated to realize that a return to an organi-
zational form based on domination is impossible. The obvious solution to
the dilemma is a reeducation of the traditionalist group. That such an
effort is necessary can be demonstrated by quoting excerpts from a letter
by a commanding officer concerning the low reenlistment rates due in part
to old fashioned "chicken" management practices:
There is no reason why modern management techniques, stressing
enlightened human relations, cannot be actively employed in every
Naval Command. There need be no conflict with discipline or tradi-
tional smartness and ceremony. Many ships, aircraft squadrons, and
a few shore establishments have been so commanded and operated, due
to a particularly dynamic and skilled commanding officer. But most
commands are only average and some provide any casual observer with
the kind of examples of chicken you describe.
The key to modern, enlightened leadership with the major emphasis
on productive human relations lies in the education of petty officers
and officers. This was the intent of the Navy's leadership program
of 1958> established by Secretary of the Navy Gates when he signed
General Order No. 21 . . . The program started well but inevitably be-
came swallowed up in vested interests and institutional apathy that
make all innovations suspect. Since "we had never lost a war" there
could not be much wrong in doing things the old way. The social and
technological revolution taking place in our society was ignored as
could have been predicted.-
That the long term trend has been and will continue to be toward a
less authoritative form of discipline is a reality. However, the Navy exists
primarily as a potential fighting force, and the combat unit necessarily re-
presents the organizational prototype. This raises the question of how far
can the Navy allow this trend away from absolutism and domination to con-
tinue and still maintain a highly efficient organization emphasizing morale
and individual initiative. This search for the proper equilibrium of
2
"Letters to the Editor," Navy Times , February 13, 1965, P- 13.
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authority is one of the dilemmas that is facing the Navy today. A serious
lesson was learned -when the authority of the commanding officer was cur-
tailed under the Uniform Code of Military Justice to the point where the
proper performance of his duties suffered. As pointed out previously, the
error was discovered and only after much effort and eight years of discus-
sion did Congress rectify the mistake. It is the author's opinion that it
is this type of trial and error approach which will lead the armed services
to a proper balance of authority and discipline commensurate with the larger
society.
The changing social philosophy with regard to authority and discipline
has been recognized and formally implemented in the Navy through the creation
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice , the inclusion of courses dealing
with psychology and human relations in the curricula at the Naval Academy
and the various Naval Reserve Officers Training Corp (NROTC) colleges, and
the issuance of General Order 21 with all its ramifications. These are the
vehicles by which the Navy hopes to achieve this shift in emphasis. Today's
times are perilous, as a nation can literally disappear from the face of the
earth if its defense efforts are not sufficient to sucessfully prevent a
nuclear exchange or neutralize the effects of an attack if one should be
launched against it. Only by the universal use of enlightened and demo-
cratic management techniques will it be possible to attract the intelligent
and highly motivated young officers and petty officers so urgently needed
in increasing numbers to man and operate the highly complex war machines
that are vital for the protection of this nation. The need has been dis-
covered, the means have been provided, the success or failure in achieving
enlightened management will in large part hinge on the emphasis placed upon












This board has arrived unanimously at the following conclusions:
1. The rapid expansion of the Army, from an establishment of
198,335 in September 1939 to 8,291,336 in May 19^5, created an
unprecedented personnel problem. When due consideration is given
to all difficulties experienced in preparing for war in a democracy,
it becomes obvious that the Army did a truly magnificent job in this
second World War.
2. A comparison of the aftermath of World War II with similar
periods following other wars, in which this country was involved,
indicates that the present reaction against the military organi-
zation is not unique and has occurred in varying degrees despite
the fact that we emerged victorious.
3. Because of the distaste of citizens in our democracy for a
regimented life in which an individual to some extent loses his
identity, and because the majority who served were conscripted
or drafted, many against their will, much of the general criticism
co Id be expected.
k. Americans look with disfavor upon any system which grants
unearned privileges to a particular class of individuals and find
distasteful any tendency to make arbitrary social distinctions be-
tween two parts of the Army.
5. There were irregularities, injustices in handling of enlisted
personnel, and abuses of privileges in the recent war to such an
extent as to cause wide-spread and deep-seated criticisms.
6. The causes of poor relationships between commissioned and
enlisted personnel are traceable, in general, to two main factors:
a. Undeniably poor leadership on the part of a small percentage
of those in positions of responsibility;
b. A system that permits and encourages a wide official and
social gap between commissioned and enlisted personnel.
7. In most instances poor leadership resulted from the thrusting
into positions of authority men who were inherently unqualified or
were inadequately trained as leaders. This was brought about by the
rapid expansion of the officer corps called for by the national emer-
gency. There were errors in selection. Orientation and indoctrination
were inadequate. Training was abbreviated. All of this resulted in
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failure to emphasize the importance of morale, efficient personnel
management, and. responsibilities. In the training, the Army was
limited to emphasizing technical proficiency. The exigencies of
time did not allow the Army to develop fully among commissioned
personnel a more liberal understanding of responsibility to their
troops
.
In selecting officers the Army was forced to rely upon the
character, background, and leadership which they demonstrated while
in the process of training.
8. The peace-time Army did not adequately prepare officers for
the war-time job of handling civilian soldiers ', it did not offer
a code of officer-enlisted man conduct flexible enough for appli-
cation to an Army in which the bulk of the men in all ranks were
civilian.
9- The official gap between commissioned and enlisted personnel
was widened during the war by untrained and unqualified officers
who carried distinctions into the social life. This was to a large
extent due to faulty interpretation of the customs and traditions
of the regular officer corps in a peace-time Army.
10. It is extremely difficult under existing procedures to get
rid of incompetents and undesirables among the officer group.
11. There is a need for a new philosophy in the military order,
a policy of treatment of men, especially in the "ranks," in terms
of advanced concepts in social thinking. The present system does
not permit full recognition of the dignity of man. More definite
protection from the arbitrary acts of superiors is essential.
12. Under the present system enlisted personnel are dependent
for the satisfaction of many of their needs upon the behavior and
attitudes of their officers, but are denied a feeling of security
and opportunities for development and self-realization. Despite
the procedures established for this purpose, enlisted personnel
and junior officers have actually not enjoyed complete freedom
in presenting their grievances. One of the most lacking yet im-
portant phases of the military structure is an alert and effective
internal policing service and an agency providing a practical means
of redress.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The Board has kept constantly in mind in weighing evidence, coming
to conclusions, and in preparing its recommendations, the following:
1. There must be assurance that we, as a nation, have a modern
economical, efficient, and effective military establishment which
can, if needed, win battles and a war.
2. Maintenance of control and discipline, which are essential to
the success of any military operation.
3. Maintenance of morale which must be of the highest order and
under continual scrutiny.
k. That the people returning from combat duty or service in the
military establishment, return in the best possible physical, mental,
moral, and spiritual condition.
5. That conditions be such as to create in the mind of the soldier
a favorable impression of the military service and the government.
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6. Improvement of the character, the knowledge, and the competency
of those who have been and those who are in the service or plan to be-
come members of the Army.
Assurance of ready availability of all elements of a military es-
tablishment in case of an emergency.
8. Assurance of ready expansion of a citizens' Army in case of a
national emergency.
The Board therefore strongly recommends
1. That steps be taken to improve leadership in the officer corps
of the Army in order that the corps will merit the respect of soldiers
and civilians alike. That this be accomplished by: (l) better selec-
tion, (2) more adequate orientation and indoctrination, (3) effective
training, (k) proper assignments, (5) promotion on basis of merit, (6)
employment of a rigorous method of screening and selecting out of in-
competents and undesirables, (7) a more effective internal policing
system to prevent abuses of privileges other than those facilities
and means which enable an officer to do a job more effectively. The
following specific ations be inaugurated:
a. Selection
That selection of men for positions of responsibility, up the scale,
be based upon the most advanced practices in personnel selection found
in industry, business, government, and those developed in the Army.
Some of the criteria should be:
(1) Previous military training, preferably one year in the enlisted
ranks, exceptions to be established in cases of outstanding individuals,
especially technicians, who, unless they qualify, should not be placed
in command positions.
(2) Character, with emphasis on interest in and potential ability to
work with and manage people.
b. Orientation and indoctrination
That sufficient time be expended in order to inculcate thoroughly:
(l) A sound appreciation of responsibilities, and especially to
subordinates.
'2) The intelligent use of authority.
,3) The idea that privileges which accompany rank and responsibility
are established to better enable an individual to perform his duties
effectively and efficiently and are not for the purpose of improving
his own personal interest.




That, in addition to the training in technical subjects, each can-
didate, whether at West Point, an ROTC unit, or Officer Candidate
School, receive such more comprehensive instruction in command respon-
sibility, personnel management, and human relations.
d. Assignment
That assignments to positions of responsibility be made on the basis
of ability and training of the individual, thus enabling the Army to
utilize talents where required.
e. Promotion and/or demotion
That a. complete review be made of the system of promotion, and that
a promotion system on a merit basis be established, making it possible
to permit especially competent individuals to be advanced ahead of any
seniority average; that some system of demotion be established whereby,
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after a trial period, if an individual does not meet the require-
ments and demonstrates that he is incapable of assuming certain
responsibilities and performing certain duties, he will be demoted.
Lack of promotion or demotion must not be the basis for any stigmat-
ization.
f. Dismissal
That, in addition to a merit system for promotion, there be estab-
lished a system whereby greater facility in eliminating the incompetent
personnel and the "undesirables" is possible, thus enabling the Army
to dismiss an individual when found not suitable for a job, incompetent
or unable to manifest the required leadership qualities. Such a pro-
cedure will eliminate unnecessary retention in the service, indiscri-
minate transfers, and other existing methods of dealing with incom-
petence. Demotion to a level where competence is obtained may be
preferable to actual dismissal.
g. Retirement
That there be established a retirement system whereby, for shorter
periods of service, 10, 20, and 30 years, individuals will have the
privilege of retiring and be assured some security for having spent
a part of their life in the Army; that, in addition, there be a regu-
lation which provides for approval of requests for retirement at any
time, thus making it relatively easier to retire; that this system
be made applicable to enlisted personnel as well as to the commission-
ed. This recommendation is made in part because the Army of the future
should be one of young men who, in general, are better a.ble to cope
with new and scientific concepts, that the retention of elder men
should be only on the basis of proven capacity to accept new ideas
(lack of open-mindedness of some senior officers in the past created
difficulties), and with the thought in mind of making it easier for
the Army to rid itself of incompetents.
h. Disability retirement
That an equitable system for commissioned and enlisted personnel be
established.
2. That steps be taken to provide all military personnel with a sense
of security, substantial compensation for duty and responsibility from
bottom to top, equitable distribution of allowances, and assurance of
a chance for advancement. It is recommended that the following specific
actions be inaugurated:
a. Base pay
That the present system or schedule of base pay be reviewed from bottom
to top and that the War Department establish a rate of pay which will
take into consideration the increased rates of pay in industry and
business in order that the Army may draw equitably from all levels of
the civilian manpower reservoir. This will tend to insure the security
and dignity of all Army personnel, eliminating many of the inequities
which now exist.
b. Allowances
That allowances be furnished to all levels, from bottom to top, includ-
ing all enlisted and commissioned personnel, on a sliding scale basis.
The following should be considered in the establishment of a new table
of allowances:
(l) Food
That food, wherever obtained by Government purchase, be distributed
equitably to all grades and ranks, providing identical privileges for
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augmentation if desired; that efforts be made to assure similarity in
preparation and service.
(2) Quarters
That, in the peace-time if quarters are to be provided on posts, camps,
stations, or bases, consideration be given to family size as well as to
rating or ra.n'.. o? individuals; that, if quarters are not to be (or can-
not be) provided on military installations, civilian costs as trail as
family size be considered in granting monetary allowances in lieu of
quarters
.
(3) Clothing and uniform
That clothing and uniforms be furnished all military personnel, whether
or not commissioned. The Board, however has no objection to personal
purchase, between military personnel, of clothing and uniforms in addi-
tion to that issued, provided what ever is purchased conforms in texture.
(h) Travel
That travel allowances for the enlisted man and for his dependents be
apportioned without discrimination in terms of radius and made equitable
for both enlisted and commissioned personnel.
3. That enlisted personnel be allowed to accumulate leave or furlough
time and granted terminal leave pay on the same basis as is now provided
for commissioned personnel; that the War Department support the legisla-
tion required to make this possible, thus eliminating the termination
injustices including mustering out pay, which now exist.
h. That all military personnel be allowed when off duty, to pursue
normal social patterns comparable to our democratic way of life.
5. That the use of discriminatory references, such as "officers and
their ladies; enlisted men and their wives," be eliminated from direc-
tives and publications issued in military establishments.
6. That there be definite equality of treatment of both enlisted and
commissioned personnel in the administration of military justice, mak-
ing all equally liable under military law for errors and faults; that
the higher the rank the more severe be the punishment; that there be a
review of all cases where wartime operations necessitated very strict
handling in order that there be due reconsideration and clemency be-
stowed where warranted; that enlisted personnel be permitted on courts,
but that every member of a court be senior to the accused.
7. That the hand salute be abandoned off Army installations and off
duty, except in occupied territories and under conditions when the pro-
cedure might be deemed necessary to properly convey military dignity to
local populations, but be employed in all official greetings in the line
of duty and continue to be manifest at ceremonial occasions and when the
national anthem is played or the colors pass by.
8. That steps be taken to establish a system of decorations and awards
which will provide for a more equitable distribution on the basis of merit
and prohibit distribution to a degree that will tend to cheapen them; that
it be made more difficult to obtain an award; the higher an individual
goes in the scale from the bottom of the enlisted to the top of the com-
missioned rar.
9. That the system for registering complaints be improved and that
inspections be for the purpose of prevention as well as investigation.
Tnis will call for augmentation and possibly reorganization of the
Inspector General's Section. The following is necessary:
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a. Staff of inspectors general must be composed of carefully selected,
highly competent individuals, whose experience particularly qualifies
them for such assignment;
b. Staff of inspectors general must be increased to the extent neces-
sary to permit it to function properly;
c. Continued study must be made of abuses with the objective of eli-
minating the causes.
d. Copies of reports of inspectors general must be transmitted to
the War Department outside regular command channels, in addition to nor-
mal procedures, in order to eliminate political aspects of control and
to insure remedial action.
10. That all regulations and instructions be so written that they
not only stipulate the limited "privileges" which are essential to the
performance of duties in positions of responsibility but also will be
regulatory in that they will prohibit or minimize possible abuses of
authority and the prestige that goes with higher rank and responsibility.
11. That abolishment of all statutes, regulations, customs, and
traditions which discourage or forbid social association of soldiers
of similar likes and tastes, because of military rank.
12. That necessary steps be tahen to eliminate the terms and concepts,
"enlisted men" and "officer," that suitable substitutes be employed (e.g.,
members of non-commissioned corps, members of commissioned corps, etc.)
and that all military personnel be referred to as "soldiers".
13. That close contact and association with civilians be encouraged
and maintained since a citizens' Army is a result of combined interest,
effort, and contribution of both military and public. A mutual exchange
of information will enhance the military organization. Length of mili-
tary service seems to automatically divorce military personnel from
civilian outlook. A maximum of military personnel living in civilian
communities rather than on Army posts, will assist in accomplishing
this.
lU. That further study be made of accumulated materials on the sub-
ject under consideration by the Board for the purpose of extracting
additional ideas which may be worthy of acceptance. 1
"Board AsJ-s More Pay, Liberal Retirements," Army- and Navy Journal ;







GENERAL ORDE.. NAVY DEPARTMENT
NO. 21 Washington, D. C, 17 May 1953
NAVAL LEADERSHIP
Part I—Discussion
The Naval profession is >rable one, which has traditionally com-
the respect and aSU ction of our country. Together with cur sister
services we serve and protect free men everywhere. To maintain the sup-
pore and respect of society, as well as to meet the requirements of his own
conscience, every Naval leader must be in himself an example of our mili-
tary ideals.
2. The United States Navy has long been distinguished for the high quality
of its oncers and men. We must never let this quality diminish. Our
ie of troubles and opportunity i. I improve
our Naval . The more powerful the weapons chat science gives
us, the more important the character and will of the men behind them. As
these develop, so does the strength of the Navy, the Nation, and the Free
World.
3. The U. S. Fighting Man's Code has well expressed the essence of our
problems:
"War has been defined as a 'contest of wills.' A trained hand holds
the weapon. But the will, the character, the spirit of the individual—
these control the hand. More than ever, in the war for the minds of
men, moral character, will, spirit are important."
4. By Naval leadership is meant the art of accomplishing the Navy's mis-
sion through people. It is the sum of those qualities of intellect, of human
understanding and of moral character that enable a man to inspire and to
nage a group of people successfully. Effective leadership, therefore, is
jed on personal example, good management practices, and moral re-
lsibility. The term leadership as used in this order shall include all
t .~'ee of these elements.
5. The objective of this general order is to reemphasize and revitalize
/al leadership in all its aspects: inspirational, technical, and moral.
Combat readiness requires that all persons in authority observe in them-
selves the standards of moral behavior and devotion to duty laid down in
Navy Regulations. The Navy must also develop and use new concepts of
management and executive development to ensure efficiency and the best
66
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use of people. The key to successful Naval leadership is personal atten-
tion and supervision based on moral responsibility.
Part II—Organization
i. The Chief of rations, the Chief of Naval Personnel, the Com-
of the Jorps Lef of Industrial Relations shall,
e Secretary of the Navy, be directly responsible for maintaining
ijp standards and conducting leadership training of Naval, Marine
Corps, and civilian personnel, respectively. The Assistant Secretary of
the Navy (P&RF) shall coordinate the three programs to provide a useful
interchange of ideas and materials.
Part III—Action
1. Every command in the Operating Forces and the Shore Establishment,
as well as every major office or bureau of the Navy Department shall re-
view, on a continuing basis, its standards of personal leadership to ensure
that those in responsible positions are discharging their duties in accord-
ance with Article 0702A and 1210 of Navy Regulations, 1948. This will
include command attention to:
a. The personal example of behavior and performance set by officers.
b. The moral atmosphere of the command.
c. The current standards of personal supervision of men, both in regard
to management effectiveness and the development of moral responsibility.
2. To achieve the objectives outlined above, every command in the Operat-
ing Forces and the Shore Establishment shall integrate into their training
programs, on a continuing basis, both the technical and moral principles
and practices of leadership.
3. The Naval Inspector General shall regularly report to the appropriate
commanders evidence of leadership that is both markedly superior to ac-
costed Navai standards or decidedly inferior. Commanders receiving such
favorable reports shall make appropriate notations on the record of the
G.Jlcer cr officers responsible. In the event that unfavorable reports are
received from the Naval Inspector, corrective action shall be initiated and
completed.
A-2 (Original General Order 21)
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4. The Chief of Naval Personnel, the Commandant of the Marine Corps and
the Chief of Industrial Relations shall issue directives to carry out the in-
tent and to achieve the objectives of this general order. These directives
shall be specific and forceful to ensure that leadership standards and
. tig are a matter of continuing concern and importance to every per-
son in authority in the Naval Establishment.
Thomas S. Gates
Secretary of the Navy
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. States Navy-Marine Corps records of victorious achievements on land, at sea,
• and war have won for these services an honored position in our great
passed on to us by our leaders, both officer and enlisted, whose out-
y and devoti n to duty are historically significant. They
fully l>y high caliber leadership and personal example. The





ive of this general order is to achieve an ever-improving state of combat readi-
ly:
izing that successful leadership at all levels is based on personal example and
moral responsibility.
b. Insuring that every man and woman are, themselves examples of military ideals.
c. Requiring personal attention to and supervision of subordinates.
Part III—Action
of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps shall be directly
maintaining optimum leadership standards. The Under Secretary of the Navy
. be responsible for the proper implementation of this order.
loot, Force, Type and Administrative commanders shall review each command's leadership
posture as an integral part of military inspections and shall include their evaluation in inspection
rts.
3. Every command and oveiy major office and bureau of the Navy Department shall, on a con-
tinuing basis, review its leadership standards; each shall take effective measures to improve them
and shall develop an awareness of the need for good leadership by providing programs for
instn in leadership principles and practices.
:. .. arsons in responsible positions, military and civilian, shall require that their subordinates
duties in accordance with traditional concepts of Navy and Marine Corps stand
-
,
paying particular attention to:
a. Moral responsibility.
(Article 0702A, Navy Regulations—Paragraph 5390, Marine Corps Manual.)
b. Personal example of behavior and performance.
(Article 1210, Navy Regulations—Paragraph 5390, Marine Corps Manual.)
c. Established standards for personnel development.
(Article 0710, Navy Regulations—Paragraph 1500, Marine Corps Manual.)
d. Integration of principles' and practices of leadership into everyday routine.
(Article 0709, Navy Regulations—Paragraph 5390, Marine Corps Manual.)
e. Effective organization and administration.
(Article 0704, Navy Regulations—Paragraph 3000, Marine Corps Manual.)
For emphasis and ready reference these articles are reprinted with this General Order.
Fred Korth





FERAL ORDKK No. 21
EXTRACTS FROM UNITED STATES NAVY REGULATIONS 1948
manders' Duties of Example and
Correction.
immandi «rs and others in an-
na) al service ure required to .
in themselves a good example of virtue, .honor,
patrioti ordination; to be vigilant
in inspecting the conduct of all persons who are
placed under their command.; to guard against
ess all dissolute and immoral prac-
o correct according to the laws and
US of the Navy, all persons who are
;
and to take all necessary and
asures, under the laws, regulations,
customs of the naval service, to promote
and safeguard the morale, the physical well-
being, and the general welfare of the officers and
op. listed persons under their command or
7-Ce.
12 .' . ..... .... ;.. the Naval
All persons in the naval service shall show
in themselves a good example of subordination,
courage, zeal, sobriety, neatness, and attention
to duty. They shall aid to the utmost of their
ability, and to the extent of their authority,
in maintaining good order and discipline, and
in ail that concerns the efficiency of the
command.
). Training and Education.
commanding officer shall
:
1. Endeavor to increase the specialized and
. professional knowledge of the person-
nel under his command by the frequent conduct
of drills, classes, and instruction, and by the
utilization of appropriate fleet and service
schoo
2. Encourage and provide assistance and fa-
tes to the personnel under his command who
to further their education in professional
or other subjects.
'.
.-./circ those lieutenants (junior grade)
mants who have less than two
.or warrant service, and all
ensip :
(a) To comply with the provisions pre-
their instruction by the Chief of
Naval Personnel, the Commandant of the Ma-
rine Corps, or the chiefs of other appropriate
bureaus.
(b) To keep journals, to attend classes,
and to receive appropriate practical instruction,
as the command er deems advisable.
•1. Detail tl rs referred to in paragraph
this article to as many duties successively
as practicable. This rotation of duties should
be completed during the first two years of the
missioned service. The command-
ing officer shall indicate on the fitness report
of each such officer the duties to which he has
been assigned, the total period of assignment,
and the decree of qualification in such duties.
.">. Designate a senior officer or officers to act
as advisers to the officers referred to in para-
ph 3 of this article. These senior officers
shall assist such junior officers to a proper
understanding of their responsibilities and
duties, and shall endeavor to cultivate in them
officer-like qualities, a sense of loyalty and
honor, and an appreciation of naval customs
and professional ethics.
0709. Welfare of Personnel.
The commanding officer shall
:
1. Use all proper means to promote the
morale, and to preserve the moral and spiritual
well-being of the personnel under his command.
2. Endeavor to maintain a satisfactory state
of health and physical fitness in the personnel
under his command.
:>. Afford an opportunity, with reasonable re-
strictions as to time and place, for the person-
nel under his command to make requests, re-
ports, or statements to him, and shall insure
that they understand the procedures for making
such requests, reports, or statements.
4. Insure that noteworthy performance of
duty of personnel under his command receive
timely and appropriate recognition and that
suitable notations are entered in the official
:ords of the individuals.
•ure that timely advancement in rating





GENERAL ORDER NO. H
1
0701. Effectiveness for Service.
The commanding officer shall
:
1. Kxerl every effort to maintain his com-
mand in a state of maximum effectiveness for
er\ ice consistent with the degree of readi-
authority.
2. Report to his appropriate senior any defi-
ciency which appreciably lessens the effective-
ness of the command.
3. Report, with his recommendations, to t iio
bureau or i concerned, whenever, in his
opinion, his authorized allowances of personnel










DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
U OF NAVAL PERSONNCL
WASHINGTON 25, D.C. IN rcply BCFcr< to
332
\ :in:
Lers assigning you to duty as commanding officer of UJS CUBi
(SS- .. .ve been issued. My purpose in writing this letter is to
.ate you on your selection for this important task; and to
car--- 01 - 02 - of the duties assigned to me by the Secretary of the
It is my responsibility to ensure that leadership standards
;ome a matter of continuing concern and importance to
you as a commanding officer.
You, of course, realize that records of officers are carefully
aed and rescreened before any officer is ordered to a command.
is process rightly demands much time from many senior officers because
s so important . I know that you are aware that the authority of
g officer is supreme and with it go many absolute responsi-
ihority and responsibility are vested in the Captain as a leader;
•
. can promote and establish leadership at all levels within
his co..-:.^nd.
Leadership is not new in the Navy - it has made our Navy great -
we had it before Communsim - and we will need it long after Comraunsim
io dead - it is not a thing of the moment but must be kept active at
levels. Since the duration of command must necessarily be short
• each of us, in order to give all deserving officers an opportunity
to exorcise it, many commanding officers do not realize the full benefits
good leadership until late in their tours. Most of them work very
I at practicing the principles and traits of a good leader; but/ some
are unaware that their officers and petty officers are not exerting
similar efforts.
I hope that you will find your new command is leadership conscious
that a viable program is already underway. In any case, your interest
and ] iieipation will be vital to a successful program.
You already know of the many useful Leadership tools available to
commanding officers upon request: '^ypQ Commanders Leadership Schools,
rs Scaools, BuPers Leadership Field Teams, pamphlets, movies, and
j recordings. Your new Type Commander or an appropriate official in
? commissioning command will probably give you a detailed leadership
during your orientation period.
7h

i be l 1 . nough to again be commanding officer of a
that would ;h on my action lii .
f Navy Regulations that
y to the Commanding C r, - 0701, 0702A, 070V,
10 are particularly important. Next in line would
could t -j during my bour to develop the three
on by exa e - i oral responsibility -
. no aa - a* c 'No. 2x«
pamphlet, "The Armed Forces Officer," NavPers 15923*
leisure time reading material to refresh my philosophy,
ils, and Lples.
1, I should be able to determine which of the many aids
aid be mo. . to me in revitalizing, reemphasizing and
roving the leadership within my command. I could then support my
ughts through actions.
Other persons' evaluations of you as a leader were important in
selecting you for command responsibility - I wish you great success in
fulfilling their beliefs.
Very sincerely,
W. R. SMSDBERG, III
* 1
1
Lieutenant Commander Rhodes B0YKIN, Jr., U.S.N.
Staff
Commander Submarine Force
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